Introduction
I was often surprised to hear students at a Christian institution discuss capital punishment as though it were an open or debated question. Of course, in the strictest sense of the word, the doctrine is debated in our secular and sentimentalist culture. Almost every argument one hears against capital punishment in our setting is an argument against its abuse: minorities are more likely to be capitally punished than others; DNA testing has exonerated many people on death row; and our system of justice is flawed in many ways. These may all be valid reasons to reform our particular system of capital punishment. But reforming an institution is not the same as repudiating or prohibiting it. It is one thing to talk about reforming capital punishment within the contemporary American criminal justice system; it is another to argue that it is inherently wrong. Further, in every generation, part of the purpose of education is to consider every question as an open question, in order to assure ourselves that we have considered our tradition carefully and critically. At a minimum, however, our students should be aware that capital punishment has been regarded by the confessing churches not only as permissible, but as a duty. Consider, as an example, the first two sections of the 23rd chapter of the Westminster Confession of Faith (all subsequent italics from Confessional quotes are the author’s addition):
WCF 23:1—God, the supreme Lord and King of all the world, hath ordained civil magistrates, to be, under him, over the people, for his own glory, and the public good: and, to this end, hath armed them with the power of the sword, for the defense and encouragement of them that are good, and for the punishment of evil doers.
WCF 23:2—It is lawful for Christians to accept and execute the office of a magistrate, when called thereunto: in the managing whereof, as they ought especially to maintain piety, justice, and peace, according to the wholesome laws of each commonwealth; so, for that end, they may lawfully, now under the New Testament, wage war, upon just and necessary occasion.
I only call attention to the fact that Westminster regarded the magistrate as instituted by God, and as given the power of the sword (an intentional allusion to Paul’s language in Romans 13) to administer justice and wage war in the Christian era (“now under the New Testament”). Those who regard the matter otherwise should, at a minimum, be aware that they are a minority voice challenging the majority of the Christian tradition, since pacifism has never been more than a minority voice therein. What’s more, this was no peculiarity of us (sometimes harsh?) Presbyterians; other ecclesiastical confessions and catechisms have said the same thing:
Luther’s Large Catechism (1530) The Fifth Commandment—Thou shalt not kill.
We have now completed both the spiritual and the temporal government, that is, the divine and the paternal authority and obedience. But here now we go forth from our house among our neighbors to learn how we should live with one another, every one himself toward his neighbor. Therefore God and government are not included in this commandment, nor is the power to kill, which they have, taken away. For God has delegated His authority to punish evil-doers to the government instead of parents, who aforetime (as we read in Moses) were required to bring their own children to judgment and sentence them to death. Therefore, what is here forbidden is forbidden to the individual in his relation to any one else, and not to the government.
Belgic Confession (1561) Article 36: The Civil Government—We believe that because of the depravity of the human race our good God has ordained kings, princes, and civil officers. He wants the world to be governed by laws and policies so that human lawlessness may be restrained and that everything may be conducted in good order among human beings. For that purpose he has placed the sword in the hands of the government, to punish evil people and protect the good.
Heidelberg Catechism (1563)—Question 105. What does God require in the sixth commandment? Answer: That neither in thoughts, nor words, nor gestures, much less in deeds, I dishonour, hate, wound, or kill my neighbour, by myself or by another: but that I lay aside all desire of revenge: also, that I hurt not myself, nor wilfully expose myself to any danger. Wherefore also the magistrate is armed with the sword, to prevent murder.
Irish Articles of Religion (1615)—61. The laws of the realm may punish Christian men with death for heinous and grievous offenses. 62. It is lawful for Christian men, at the commandment of the magistrate, to bear arms and to serve in just wars.
Savoy Declaration (Congregational, 1658) Chapter 24 Of the Civil Magistrate—God the supreme Lord and King of all the world, hath ordained civil magistrates to be under him, over the people for his own glory and the public good; and to this end hath armed them with the power of the sword, for the [defense] and encouragement of them that do good, and for the punishment of evil-doers.
Philadelphia Baptist Confession (1742) Chapter 25 Of the Civil Magistrate—1. God, the supreme Lord and King of all the world, hath ordained civil magistrates to be under him, over the people, for his own glory and the public good; and to this end hath armed them with the power of the sword, for [defense] and encouragement of them that do good, and for the punishment of evil doers.
Each of these confessional statements acknowledges that the civil government is ordained by God to punish evildoers, up to and including punishing them capitally. Their use of “sword” is an intentional allusion to Paul in Romans 13, and they can mean no less of it than he did (see comments below). The Irish Articles of Religion even expressly say that “Christian men” also are liable to capital punishment; surely others are as well.
Human creeds and confessions may err; but when such a number of them say the same thing in different countries in different times, there is prima facie reason to believe their statements were well-grounded, since they allude to the language of the apostle Paul, speaking in Holy Scripture. At a minimum, this consensus position satisfies the burden of proof.
The Canonical Background
I concur with those many scholars who regard Romans 13 to be Paul’s own reflection on the realities m ans 13 to be Paul’s own reflection on the realities of Genesis 9:6–7, about which I offer these very abbreviated comments. Students of Genesis recall that the human race, in its rebellion against God, became remarkably evil. Cain killed his brother (Gen. 4:8); his descendant Lamech was vengefully blood-thirsty (Gen. 4:23–24). Wickedness spread at such a rate that, by the time of Noah, Moses observed, “The LORD saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every intention of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually” (Gen. 6:5). This is why God judged the earth through the Noahic flood. Genesis 9 records what happened when the floodwaters receded, and when those on the ark re-emerged onto the earth again:
And God blessed Noah and his sons and said to them, “Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth. … And for your lifeblood I will require a reckoning: from every beast I will require it and from man. From his fellow man I will require a reckoning for the life of man. Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed, for God made man in his own image. And you, be fruitful and multiply, teem on the earth and multiply in it” (Gen. 9:1–7).
We observe that twice here, at the beginning and end of the passage, the language of the original creation mandate from Genesis 1:26–28 is employed (“God blessed them…Be fruitful and multiply…”). But the teeming, multiplying, and thriving of the human race is threatened by the violence of people like Cain and Lamech. Those who emerge from the ark must recognize that sin and violence emerge with them and still threaten them. But God will not permit such violence to threaten his created purposes for the human race; to the contrary, God will “require a reckoning” for those who shed blood, and he therefore institutes the duty of such a reckoning: “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed, for God made man in his own image.” Note that God will not send an angel of death to require a reckoning for bloodshed, nor will God himself continue to rid the world of the wicked through a series of floods; he requires that humans execute this reckoning: “by man shall his blood be shed.” Exercising capital punishment justly is, after the flood-judgment, an additional duty in the fallen era for those who bear God’s image.
Paul, trained in the Hebrew Scriptures, knew Genesis 9 well, and many scholars regard Romans 13 as Paul’s reflection on the reality of Genesis 9. Let us examine the passage as distinct but interrelated parts:
Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God. 2 Therefore he who resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment. 3 For rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad. Would you have no fear of him who is in authority? Then do what is good, and you will receive his approval, 4 for he is God’s servant for (your) good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword in vain; he is the servant of God to execute (his) wrath on the wrongdoer. 5 Therefore one must be subject, not only to avoid (God’s) wrath but also for the sake of conscience. 6 For the same reason you also pay taxes, for the authorities are ministers of God, attending to this very thing. 7 Pay to all what is owed to them: taxes to whom taxes are owed, revenue to whom revenue is owed, respect to whom respect is owed, honor to whom honor is owed. (Rom. 13:1–7)
This passage divides itself into three parts. The first part (1a) describes a basic duty: “be subject to the governing authorities.” The text, unlike many pulpiteers, does not say “obey” (ὑπακούετε); it says, “be submissive to” (ὑποτασσέσθω). In both English and Greek there is a difference, and since Paul employs “obey” in Ephesians. 6:1, and “submit” in the previous verses 5:21 and 24, he knows the difference, and may be presumed to have chosen his language as deliberately here as he did in Ephesians 5 and 6. The second part, 1b–2, explains the ground for this duty, that the civil magistrate is instituted by God. The third part, 3–7, explains God’s purpose for instituting the civil magistrate, and the power given the civil magistrate to affect these purposes. Note the logic in these three parts: There is an imperative (submit to the authorities), a ground for the imperative (because the authorities are ordained by God), and two purposes for the ground. First, God has instituted the magistrate for the purpose of rewarding good and punishing evil. Second, to enforce this, God has given the magistrate the “sword.” That is, the magistrate is given the power of the sword by God for this limited (and only morally justifiable) purpose of rewarding/promoting good behavior, while punishing/ suppressing evil behavior. We can represent the logic visually, with A, B, and C as the major components.
A. The civil magistrate is instituted to promote good behavior … For rulers are not a terror to good conduct … do what is good, and you will receive his approval for he is God’s servant for (your) good… and to punish wicked behavior rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad But if you do wrong, be afraid he is the servant of God to execute (his) wrath on the wrongdoer.
B. To accomplish this end, the civil magistrate is given the authority to inflict capital punishment (“he does not bear the sword in vain”).
Pause here before we get back to our logical depiction of the passage (C). This is not merely figurative language; swords were not employed to spank people; the sword (Greek: μάχαιρα) was a weapon designed to kill. Peter used a sword to cut off the ear of the high priest’s servant (John 18:10); one may justly assume that, had Peter’s aim been better, he would have cleaved the skull itself and killed Malchus, which was probably his intent. When the Philippian jailor thought the apostles had escaped, “he drew his sword (σπασάμενος μάχαιραν) and was about to kill himself” (Acts 16:27). And the author of Hebrews, considering the Old Testament martyrs, said, “They were stoned, they were sawn in two, they were killed with the sword (ἐν μαχαίρῃ ἀποκτανθῆναι)” (Heb. 11:37). The consistent witness of the New Testament is that some behaviors “deserve” to be punished by death, indicating that some version of retributive justice must have prevailed (italics added for emphasis):
Luke 23:15—Neither did Herod, for he sent him back to us. Look, nothing deserving death has been done by him.
Acts 23:29—I found that he was being accused about questions of their law, but charged with nothing deserving death or imprisonment.
Acts 25:11—If then I am a wrongdoer and have committed anything for which I deserve to die, I do not seek to escape death. But if there is nothing to their charges against me, no one can give me up to them. I appeal to Caesar.
Acts 25:25—But I found that he had done nothing deserving death. And as he himself appealed to the emperor, I decided to go ahead and send him.
Acts 26:31—And when they had withdrawn, they said to one another, “This man is doing nothing to deserve death or imprisonment.”
Rom. 1:32—Though they know God’s decree that those who practice such things deserve to die, they not only do them but give approval to those who practice them.
Now, back to our final component in the logical representation of the passage.
C. Both the civil magistrate’s purpose and the means of accomplishing that purpose are contained in the summary in verse 5: “Therefore one must be subject, not only to avoid (God’s) wrath but also for the sake of conscience.”
The first part of this summary, obscured by the RSV’s and ESV’s gratuitous insertion of “God’s,” reminds us that the civil magistrate is to be submitted to because of his ability to sanction. He may employ the sword to execute “wrath,” and if you wish to avoid this wrath, submit to him. The second part summarizes by indicating that conscience itself requires us to be good and do good, and for this reason also the one who enforces good behavior is to be obeyed. That is, “conscience” is invoked because (and insofar as) the magistrate rewards good and punishes evil. Note the chiastic ABBA parallel:
A for he is God’s servant for (your) good
B he is the servant of God to execute (his) wrath “Therefore you are to obey”
B not only to avoid (God’s) wrath
A but also for the sake of conscience
Thus, both because the civil magistrate rewards good and because he uses the sword on those who do evil, he is to be obeyed. Insofar as he rewards good, there is a moral or conscientious reason to obey him; insofar as he has power to kill (or otherwise punish), there is a prudential reason to obey him. There are two distinct reasons for our submitting to the civil magistrate, not one. If it were always a conscientious duty to obey the magistrate on every point, why would Paul mention the second reason? Whether the magistrate would punish us or not would be irrelevant, if it were our conscientious duty to obey him. The duties of conscience have nothing to do with the gains or pains associated with such duties.
When one wrestles, then, with the ticklish question of the limitations of our duty to obey the civil magistrate, Romans 13 becomes very helpful. Plainly, the civil magistrate is not to be obeyed implicitly or blindly, because:
A. the apostles did not do so (Acts 4:19 and 5:29); B. it would be contrary to the nature and duty of conscience to obey anyone but God
B. it would be contrary to the nature and duty of conscience to obey anyone but God implicitly (cf. WCF on Liberty of Conscience).
Limits to Our Submission to the Civil Magistrate
What, then, are the limits of our submission to the civil magistrate? First, it would be sinful to submit to the magistrate when he commands us to omit a positive duty or when he commands us to commit a positive sin. Second, it would be sinful to not submit to the civil magistrate in such a flagrant or public manner as to challenge or disregard God’s good purpose in instituting such government (note, for instance, the respectful manner in which the apostles disobey in Acts 5:29). Third, our conscientious responsibility to submit to the civil magistrate is itself determined by the magistrate’s adherence to his divinely established purpose. That is, in circumstances where he neither commands what is evil (in which case we must disobey) nor commands what is morally right (in which case we must submit), but merely commands regarding a matter that is “indifferent” in itself, we are not morally obliged to submit to him, because the conscience can never be obliged to implicit obedience, and, indeed, it is the magistrate who has sinned by stepping beyond his divinely established role to reward good and punish evil. Fourth, prudence, however, may dispose us to submit to the civil magistrate even where conscience does not. If the magistrate, for instance, required us to put whitewall tires on our automobiles, on pain of death, we would submit not for conscience’s sake (since it is not inherently right or wrong, by divine standards, to have whitewalls; and the magistrate has stepped beyond his divinely-instituted prerogatives in requiring such), but for the sake of prudence (why surrender life for such a trivial matter as whitewall tires?). It is not immoral to have whitewalls, and so conscience does not require us to not submit. Similarly, it is not morally necessary to have whitewalls, and therefore conscience does not require our obedience. Prudential considerations alone—the power the magistrate has to punish those who disobey him, and the likelihood and consequences of his employing it—govern our behavior in such a circumstance. Of course, the sword is a figurative expression of the remarkable power of the civil magistrate, and he does not always resort to this final expression of his authority. He may choose less extreme (though always coercive) measures, such as banishment from his realm and its protection, incarceration, etc.
This view was earlier proposed by theologians such as Thomas Manton (1620–1677):
Whatever God commandeth, I am bound to do even in secret, though it be to my absolute prejudice; but now submission to man may be performed by suffering the penalty, though the obedience required be forborne; and in some cases a man may do contrary in private, where the thing is indifferent, and there is no danger of scandal and contempt of authority.
Manton recognized that it is consistent with our “submission to man” either to suffer the penalty for disobedience, or to disobey privately and not be punished, if the matter required was not a moral issue (and therefore not properly something the civil magistrate could require anyway).
Manton concurred with the Westminster Assembly (of which he was a commissioner), which rather remarkably (considering that the Assembly itself was called by the Long Parliament) only required obedience to the magistrate’s “lawful” commands: “It is the duty of people to pray for magistrates, to honor their persons, to pay them tribute or other dues, to obey their lawful commands, and to be subject to their authority, for conscience’ sake” (WCF 23:4, italics mine). However self-consciously, this differs from the earlier Lutheran confessions. The Augsburg Confession (1530) had said: “Christians, therefore, must necessarily obey their magistrates and laws, save only when they command any sin; for then they must rather obey God than men.” Westminster used much more ambiguous language than the Augsburg Confession had employed; permitting one to embrace the Augsburg view, but also permitting views such as those of Manton.
Exercising capital punishment justly is, after the flood-judgment, an additional duty in the fallen era for those who bear God’s image.
Those such as myself who adopt the view of Manton (et al.) recognize that the magistrate about whom Paul wrote was a Roman, who neither acknowledged the Law of Moses nor the teachings of Christ. When Paul said of this Roman magistrate that such “rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad” (Rom. 13:3), what did he mean by good and bad conduct? The opinion of Manton and others was that “good” and “bad” were not here references to the highest Christian ethic, but to those essentials of public morality or justice necessary for cultures to thrive. “Bad” in such a context probably meant something like what John Locke suggested, when he said, “no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions.”
Theoretically, this viewpoint is consistent with the definition of Christian liberty and liberty of conscience taught in the Reformed standards and also consistent with the instructions of Romans 13, which prescribes not only our submission to the magistrate, but also the proper arena or limits of the magistrate’s authority. Practically, this viewpoint justifies the practice of many believers who routinely disobey the civil magistrate (knowingly or unknowingly) in an era when the civil magistrate’s laws more frequently deal with matters of indifference than they do with matters of morality. Many Christians adopt this practice, while professing in theory that they are obliged to obey the civil magistrate in every area that is not sin per se. My practice is no worse than my theory; if one is wrong, both are wrong.
Conclusion
Romans 13 is almost as interesting for what it does not say as for what it says. It addresses the civil magistrate at greater length, and in greater detail, than any other passage in the New Testament, and is therefore a passage that may not be set aside when considering the magistrate, in light of the realities of the New Testament. To the contrary, it is the most important passage to deal with, in attempting to assess the magistrate within the framework of commitment to Christianity. But something should be said about Constantinianism.
Constantine, via the Edict of Milan, agreed to cease persecuting Christians. It was not until the Edict of Thessalonica in 380, however, that the emperor Theodosius I declared Christianity to be the official imperial religion. Western Christianity has been so influenced by Constantinianism that many, if not most, western Christians are Constantinian by default, even if they have never consciously thought about the matter. Constantinianism is that (de facto if not de jure) belief that the church will prosper best when, and insofar as, she is aided by the magistrate; by his own faith, and by his resources and powers. While everyone grants that Constantinianism could not have existed, historically, until there was a magistrate who professed Christianity, fewer recognize that Constantinianism need never have existed, exegetically speaking.
The magistrate to whom the apostle Paul referred was manifestly a Roman magistrate. When Paul’s letter to the Romans was written, the civil magistrate was a Roman. This Roman would not have embraced Christianity or Judaism and would not have required such faith of his citizens, nor would he have required them to embrace either the so-called Golden Rule of Christianity or the decalogue of Judaism. Indeed, it is not only likely, but probable, that he had never heard of either of them. Despite this lack of recognition of the moral teachings of the Bible, Paul called the magistrate “a minister of God for your good.” Thus, it is not necessary to the magistrate’s fulfilling his God-ordained role that he either endorse or even know the Jewish or Christian Scriptures, or their moral content.
What is necessary is that he be a “terror to evil conduct,” and since the Scriptures elsewhere consider many acts of the heart or mind to be evil, Paul must be using the term differently here, to refer to public evil, to evil that harms the public in its pursuit of its creational calling. At the very least, the magistrate must protect his citizens in two ways. First, he must be a terror to those who would commit crimes against persons. He cannot permit Cains to slay Abels with impunity. Culture and civilization cannot make progress when people live in fear of their lives, or if their lives are taken with impunity. It took Brahms, as an example, seven years to write his Ein deutsches Requiem, and if someone had taken his life after two years, the world would not have had the fruit of his labors. Second, the magistrate must be a terror to those who would commit crimes against property. Again, culture cannot make progress if its long-range building plans can be interrupted, without impunity, by the wicked. If a contractor hauls lumber to a site to begin construction, and if another is permitted to come and take that lumber and burn it as firewood, the building will not get built.
It would be sinful to submit to the magistrate when he commands us to omit a positive duty or when he commands us to commit a positive sin.
It is virtually self-evident that such protection of persons and property is a duty of the magistrate, because nearly all civilizations have recognized it. Surely, all civilizations that value beauty and utility recognize it. Paul just assumed that the magistrate would realize this, and that he would protect (and does protect) both persons and property and is therefore to be regarded as God’s minister.
Note, however, that Paul cared nothing at all (in a passage discussing the magistrate and our duty towards him) about the magistrate’s personal religious faith. It didn’t concern Paul in any way that the magistrate was not a Christian, or that he did not promote Christianity. He didn’t even indicate that it is our duty to pray for his conversion to Christianity: “First of all, then, I urge that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for all people, for kings and all who are in high positions, that we may lead a peaceful and quiet life, godly and dignified in every way” (1 Tim. 2:1–2). Paul did not instruct the Ephesians to pray for the magistrates that they (kings) may lead a godly life, but that “we may lead a peaceful and quiet life…” For Paul, it was the church’s responsibility to propagate Christianity, not the magistrate’s.
One cannot but contrast Paul’s view with the common (Constantinian?) view that we should persuade the magistrate to make public commendation of Christianity, or the Judeo-Christian tradition, or the Ten Commandments, as though something vital were at stake in his so doing. Whether there might be merit in such recommendations is a matter I am tentatively willing to consider, but what I am not willing to consider (without substantial reasoning from Romans 13) is any notion that it is somehow necessary for the magistrate to do so. Paul’s unbelieving Roman and pagan magistrate was good enough for him, and good enough for Paul to call him “God’s minister for good.”
The magistrate fulfills God’s purpose whether or not he endorses Christianity or the Ten Commandments, or anything else distinctive to our religion. The magistrate is analogous to the waste disposal person; he performs a duty that is vital to the public well-being, but also a duty that is odious. Christians should keep all of this in mind—especially Paul’s argument in Romans 13:1–7—when discussing capital punishment with people in today’s society. The Apostle Paul and our confessional